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Introduction

Throughout the past 30 years, the expansion of gender lenses into conflict analyses has led
to a plethora of research attempting to recognize and rectify the negative gendered outcomes of
conflict and post-conflict environments. The result has led to policies, even governments and cabinets, oriented to removing obstacles to women and their empowerment in political, social, and
economic spheres following the fallouts created by conflict. The full awareness of gender sensitivity in conflict and post-conflict environments, after decades of activism and advocacy, finally
came with the violence incurred in the 1990s with the Yugoslav Wars and Rwandan Civil War,
their ethnic cleansings and genocides, and the widespread use of rape and sexual violence against
targeted groups (namely, Bosniaks and Tutsis).1 The consequences of gendered violence carried
on in gendered outcomes, resulting in programs which sought to aid and empower women throughout society as they moved into post-conflict and post-genocide worlds, whether it was maternal
care, health care, or empowerment in economic and political spheres.2 These peacebuilding programs sought to right the wrongs committed in conflict, while also correcting the unjust and unequal gender relations which preceded it.
However, there is a problem. The inclusion of gender lenses for all the positives it has and
continues to do remains one rather one-dimensional in its focus, leaving out entire swathes of
gender which continue to have their own experiences and challenges in conflict and post-conflict
settings. Most notable of this exclusion is the experiences and challenges of men, who tend to be
unaccounted for in conflict and post-conflict gender lenses. Additionally, the men who fight within

1

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first case of rape being
held as an act of genocide. International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,’
accessed 5 December 2021, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/ictr-prosecutor-v-jean-paul-akayesu.
2
This is especially apparent in the programs created to aid women with the care of children born from rape, who had
been transmitted HIV/AIDS, and include them in economic and political structures that not only had been vacated by
men due to their participation or death in conflict.
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these conflicts are treated more so as combatants transitioning towards civilian life, rather than
men in conflict transitioning towards men in peace. The exclusion of lenses of gender thus leaves
out the myriad of tensions that masculinity faces (the pressures of what it is to be ‘doing male’);
which first lionized the use of arms, strength, fearlessness, and the suppression of emotions to be
able to conduct soldierly life, that is now out of sync with civilian life that prioritizes masculinity
with civilian labour, non-violence, and emotional openness to deal with the consequences of conflict.3 Post-conflict masculinity must also negotiate an environment where gender relations have
changed, as women step into traditionally male roles. Such tensions may produce feelings of threat,
which may produce a reaction in an attempt to reassert masculinity that may derail peace processes
or create violence in civilian life.4
The purpose of this paper is to inspect the place in which ex-combatant men navigate masculinity and manhood as they transition from conflict to peace in their experiences with the peacebuilding process, namely the processes of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) that attempt to bring ex-combatants into civilian life through demilitarization, education, and
community integration. The analysis will be centered on the Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its adjacent states of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, of which the
security environment is highly interconnected and interrelated.5 The region, which has seen warfare conflict as an everlasting presence, has had many different attempts of peacebuilding, DDR,
and reconstruction, as it contends with various state and sub-state actors vying for control of

Brandon Hamber, ‘Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay,’ Peace Prints: South Asian Journal
of Peacebuilding 3, no. 1 (2010): 11–12.
4
Hamber, ‘Masculinity and Transitional Justice,’ 12.
5
Kivu Security Tracker, ‘Kivu Security Tracker | Crisis Mapping in Eastern Congo,’ Crisis Mapping in Eastern
Congo, accessed 5 July 2022, https://kivusecurity.org/map#. In numbers, the Kivu Security Tracker reports that since
2017, there have been 9,002 reported incidences from violent deaths to the destruction of property, with 3,388 of them
involving Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan state forces. For a map detailing the Kivu and Ituri regions,
see Appendix 1.
3
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territory, its people, and its resources.6 The region will be used as a center of focus, rather than a
particular case study, intended to capture as much information while keeping relative factors of
history and culture consistent. Altogether, the aim is to provide a wider approach to gender in
conflict spaces and give a more holistic view of the complicated dynamics of gender relations as
they transition to peace. By adding dimensions of manhood and masculinity, the aim is to provide
more stability and success to peace processes through their relationships to economic, political,
and familial environments and the institutions that are meant to support them. The paper will utilize
pre-existing literature, research, and analyses from scholars across disciplines, from economics to
gender studies, to provide a multi-disciplinary and qualitative approach to masculinity and peace
practice.
The paper will be divided into five sections, beginning with the concepts, practices, institutions, and goals of peacebuilding. This will explore how DDR and gender fit within the larger
program. It will then move to the theoretical dimensions of gender and masculinity to explain the
various interpretations, structures, and practices of multiple masculinities within conflict, postconflict, and peace processes. It will explain the concept of ‘masculinities’ as conceptualized by
R.W. Connell to understand the notions of violent/militarized masculinity and its transitions to
post-conflict environments. From there, the history of the Kivu region will be discussed to outline
the context in which analyses will be made. The region's history from its experiences under colonialism onward towards the contemporary conflict environment, with particular focuses on the
Rwandan genocide and Great African Wars of the 1990s. This will lead to analyses of how peacebuilding and DDR processes in the region contend with masculinities in peace transitions and what

Reagan El Mirivi and Pierre Boisselet, ‘Does the New Disarmament and Demobilization Program Stand a Chance of
Success?’ Kivu Security Tracker (blog), 16 September 2021, https://blog.kivusecurity.org/does-the-new-disarmament-and-demobilization-program-stand-a-chance-of-success/. The Security Tracker also lists approximately 122
armed groups active in the eastern DRC.
6

Matthews

6

are potential gendered challenges faced by men as they transition to civilian life, such as broken
state institutions and economies, psychosocial damage and rehabilitation, and the subsequent gender-relations of post-conflict society. Lastly, analysis of how the Kivutien case rests across conflict, post-conflict, and peacebuilding processes across the world, and what the utility in lenses of
masculinity in peacebuilding globally may have to offer, such as providing differential gender
lenses, lenses of victimhood and perpetrators, psychosocial and behavioural consideration, economics and politics, and the overarching international gender framework of Resolution 1325.
Section I: What is ‘peacebuilding’? How does DDR fit and contribute to the peacebuilding
program?
In the aftermath of conflict, the structures that create peace environments are weakened, if
not destroyed. These structures range from the economies, political apparatuses, to social settings
and everything in between, including gender relations. Nestled between the peacebuilding structure and its programs lies DDR, as it attempts to reintegrate ex-combatants into the post-conflict
environment. However, given the destruction of the state and social structures from conflict, the
problem becomes what ex-combatants reintegrate or reinsert themselves into. Writing on the reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique, Jaremy McMullin recalls an in-joke between the participants of the DDR program, in which they share a laugh on the poverty they experience in a
post-conflict society, stating: ‘The government told us, ‘Congratulations. Now you are all equally
poor. You have been reintegrated back into basic poverty.’’7 This tongue-in-cheek joke exemplifies the difficulties of post-conflict peacebuilding and DDR, where problems become self-reinforcing as economic/political insecurity directly impacts the post-conflict livelihoods of ex-

7

Jaremey McMullin, Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration, (London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 8, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=1366415.
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combatants, sometimes threatening the very foundations of sustainable peace. This section will
further explain what peacebuilding means in its goals, how DDR fits within the program, and how
gender fits within the picture.
Peacebuilding as a concept and practice
The term ‘peacebuilding’ first appeared in sociologist Johan Galtung’s 1976 essay ‘Three
Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding’, where he outlines peacebuilding as a structural and systematic process of building preventative measures that induce war
and conflict, stating: ‘structures must be found that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to
wars where wars may occur.’8 While Galtung outlined the theoretical conceptualization of peacebuilding in the 1970s it was not until the 1990s that it would see mainstream practice or policy.
The introduction of peacebuilding to the international community flowered when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his Agenda for Peace to the UN in 1992, outlining
his recommendations in dealing with post-Cold War era conflicts (of which his tenure as SecretaryGeneral would see many, including the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide within it.) He outlined post-conflict peacebuilding as ending civil strife, disarming warring parties, restoring order,
destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing human rights, reforming and strengthening institutions, and promoting political participation through both informal and formal means.9 In addition, he emphasized the sustained and cooperative effort to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems,
establishing a robust foundation for peace to flourish.10 This hoped to address the most profound

Johan Galtung, ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,’ in Peace, War and
Defense, Galtung, Johan. Essays in Peace Research; v.2 (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1976), 298.
9
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping.’ (United
Nations, 31 January 1992), 32, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749.
10
Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace,’ 33.
8
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causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression.11 Boutros-Ghali’s
agenda would be adopted by the UN General Assembly later in 1993, adding post-conflict peacebuilding into the international policy toolkit.12
Altogether, as envisioned by Galtung and Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding was an expansive
project of post-conflict programming that had not been seen before. In the era of rising intra-state
conflict (or ‘New Wars’ as theorized by Mary Kaldor), peacebuilding takes upon a deeply ambitious project that may be characterized as essentially remaking post-conflict societies.13 This immensity is a source of the most significant difficulties of peacebuilding, as the tasks at hand often
become wholly too expansive to manage, especially in the hands of the complicated nature of
international politics, economics, and the UN.
Considering the gravity of which the international community (especially the UN, which
has increasingly taken up peacebuilding and peacekeeping as its bread-and-butter since the 1990s)
has not gone without its share of problems. With many peacebuilding efforts taking place within
the African continent, longstanding spectres of colonialism, various rebel/militia activities, ethnic
loyalties and rivalries, political strongmen, boundary/border disputes, inter-woven political interests and interventionism become lofty barriers to the very precarious work of peacebuilding.14
Additionally, problems born from conflict present new challenges; the proliferation of weapons,
sexual slavery, abduction, torture, displacement and refugees, environmental degradation and

Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace,’ 8.
United Nations General Assembly, ‘A/RES/47/120 B. An Agenda for Peace’ (UN Documents, 20 September 1993),
http://www.un-documents.net/a47r120b.htm.
13
The “New Wars” concept that posits that post-Cold War conflict are dominated by sub-state entities fighting for
reasons of identity, fought with unconventional means, and financed in largely illegal or non-direct transfers. See
more: Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999);
Mary Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars,’ Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 1 (7
March 2013): Art. 4, https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.at.
14
Kenneth Omeje et al., Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region (Bloomington, United States:
Indiana University Press, 2013), 1–2, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=1211185.
11
12
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destruction, and health crises (especially HIV/AIDS) provide confounding issues that further compromise efficacious peacebuilding responses.15 To highlight the difficulty of peacebuilding in the
Congolese case, 70% of peace processes fail to deliver durable and lasting peace arrangements,
and 20% of peace agreements relapsed into large-scale violence.16
The intrinsic difficulty of peacebuilding is made more difficult by the various actors that
attempt to work in complicated post-conflict environments. Sometimes, peacebuilders themselves
add to the disharmony of peacebuilding as various actors attempt to push through with their idea
of what ‘peace’ will look like. In an already strained environment, the loss of clarity may lead to
operational haziness, which seriously undermines efforts. This has led to characterizations of
peacebuilders being technocrats who are out of touch with the realities on the ground; or as characterized in an interview conducted with a local Congolese as the ‘humanoids,’ as ‘those who came
with ideals, vigour, but come from a different planet.’17 By this he meant that peacebuilders ‘have
their own world, its own customs, its own beliefs, its own roles, its own stars, its own villains, its
own taboos, its own meeting places, and its own culture.’18 This means that within peacebuilding,
the goals and the means to them are often unsettled debates, often disconnected from the populations they are meant to serve, causing gaps in trust and legitimacy, if not actively detrimental to

15

Omeje et al., Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region, 2.
Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding /
[Electronic Resource], Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 5.
17
Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 1. The local interviewed was an elderly Congolese man of European
descent, of which there are very few.
18
Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo, 1; Some have critiqued peacebuilding as potentially neo-colonial or neoimperial in its practice. See more: David Roberts, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding From Itself,’ Peace Review 24, no.
3 (July 2012): 366–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2012.704328; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making
Versus
the
Liberal
Peace,’
Cooperation
and
Conflict
43,
no.
2
(2008):
139–63,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836708089080; Kristoffer Lidén, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Introduction: Beyond Northern Epistemologies of Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed?,’ International Peacekeeping 16, no.
5 (2009): 587–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303230; Kimberly Zisk Marten, ‘Peace, or Change?,’ in One.
Peace, or Change? (Columbia University Press, 2004), 1–20, https://doi.org/10.7312/mart12912-002.
16
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efforts themselves. Altogether, peacebuilding is a complex and massive endeavour both in intrinsic
and extrinsic means and requires holistic planning and coordination for its success to be realized.
DDR, its goals, and practices
The place that DDR occupies in the wider peacebuilding picture is a mechanism of demilitarization and is often done alongside its close relative, security sector reform (SSR), as part of a
wider post-conflict security arrangement.19 The goal of DDR is to disarm the combatants involved
in the conflict (with collection and disposal of small arms), demobilize combatants from the field
and their operational units (sometimes with stays in demobilization camps when ‘home’ is not
clear or inaccessible) and reintegrate (or reinsert) former combatants into civilian life (with a wide
variety of programs or packages to ease the transition, from vocational training to medical care).20
As outlined in the UN Brahimi Report, DDR attempts to address the immediate aftermath
of conflict on the ground level to provide stability for prolonged peacebuilding and prevent conflict
reoccurrence, often coinciding with a larger peacekeeping mission.21 The report, especially for the
Kivutien case, is important as it sought to address the major flaws of international peacekeeping
and peacebuilding after the failures experienced in Rwanda. It outlines the intrinsic need for all
three pillars to succeed for the overall program, stating that ex-combatants are at risk if they find
no legitimate livelihood in the post-conflict environment (i.e. reintegrate into the local economy)
of returning to lives of violence.22 While maintaining a prominent place within the more extensive
peacekeeping/peacebuilding apparatus, DDR tends to have shifting funding, planning, and support

19

Broadly, SSR is the reformation of military and police forces in the post-conflict environment.
Chandra Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, ‘DDR and Transitional Justice: Bridging the Divide?,’ Conflict, Security & Development 9, no. 4 (2009): 457–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800903395999.
21
United Nations Security Council, ‘Brahimi Report,’ 21 August 2000, 7, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F55%2F305&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
22
United Nations Security Council, ‘Brahimi Report,’ 7–8.
20
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structures both within and outside the UN, leading to what they concede as ‘lacks a designated
focal point within the United Nations system.’23
In peacebuilding, DDR is the process of dealing with the combatants themselves, providing
the avenue from soldier to civilian in a society that is moving from conflict to peace. 24 However,
much like the overarching peacebuilding effort, this can also be a tremendously difficult endeavour. For example, after periods of conflict and instability, ownership of weapons may be perceived
as a status symbol, complicating the collection of small arms.25 Since DDR occurs during periods
of transition, ex-combatants are taking a risk by disarming and thus need to be assured of their
security and well-being and that their giving up of arms is part of a long-term investment of peace
and security.26 This carries onto the demobilization process; ex-combatants may fear losing what
is, to many, the only life they know in soldiering. Moreover, they may be fearful of losing the
prestige gained them as a combatant or the loss of power of their political faction/leadership.27 The
challenges posed by reintegration (or reinsertion) tend to be the most substantial and wide-reaching
from the program, as it is multidimensional in terms of what it needs to address (from economic
aid to psychosocial care), as well as requiring the support of not just combatants, but also the
support of the entire conflict-affected population (as a process of broader reconciliation).28 The
conditions made by conflict make this process extremely difficult, as conflict robs communities of

United Nations Security Council, ‘Brahimi Report,’ 8.
It is worth mentioning that DDR, in terms recognizable to lay-persons, are akin to western programs such as the
American GI Bill, which provide benefits, resources, and other compensations to veterans (ex-combatants) in their
post-service life.
25
United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration’: (New York, United States: United Nations, 11 February 2000), 6, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/407791.
26
United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration,’ 6.
27
United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration,’ 11.
28
Sriram and Herman, ‘DDR and Transitional Justice,’ 465–66; United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of
United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,’ 15–16.
23
24
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their economies, infrastructure, social cohesion and trust, on top of the factors that pushed them
into conflict in the first place.29 Should peacebuilding actors fail to provide an adequate environment for peace to thrive, the risk of failure grows. When put into the wider context of peacebuilding, DDR provides a functional microcosm for the overall process to succeed as it aims to deal
with factors born from and of conflict, from the disposal of weapons to the social atmospheres of
both combatants and non-combatants.
DDR and Gender
As part of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 and its commitment to address
the impacts of conflict on women and girls, DDR and peacebuilding have followed suit to analyze
and rectify the gendered impacts of conflict and post-conflict life.30 Resolution 1325 is the Security
Council document which codifies the inclusion of gender analyses, supports women’s rights in
conflict and post-conflict environments, and includes their participation in post-conflict negotiations and reconstruction. As outlined before, part of the peacebuilding program is to confront the
issues of sexual slavery, torture, HIV/AIDS, and other forms of oppression, often of which come
with explicit or implicit gender impacts. The UN’s document outlining its engagement with DDR
highlights the need for special protection measures for women, girls, and children, with considerations for child soldiery, forced violence, sexual abuse, and the parenthood of children born from
wartime sexual violence.31 In the halls and practices of the UN, gender sensitivities included in
peacebuilding and DDR processes have become central to the organization's larger Women, Peace,

United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration,’ 16–17; McMullin, Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State, 19–20.
30
UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolution 1325,’ PeaceWomen, 2000, http://www.peacewomen.org/SCR1325.
31
United Nations Secretary-General, ‘The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration,’ 18.
29
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and Security (WPS) agenda and are understood to be among the central tenets of peacebuilding
work.
Within the UN’s integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards
(IDDRS), gender is highlighted as a ‘cross-cutting issue’ for DDR practices. They find that within
DDR programs, women are often neglected (or shielded by armed groups) for a myriad of reasons,
from fear of legal and social consequences (on the part of groups and commanders), they do not
fit the ‘role’ of combatant (such as not carrying a weapon), having experienced gender-based violence (GBV), or being associated with an armed group.32 This was most evident in DDR processes
in Colombia and Liberia, where women combatants were given the same treatment or were excluded from DDR, due to gendered factors.33 In response, the standards set forth by the IDDRS
attempt to match the involvement of women in armed groups with the appropriate DDR procedure
to accommodate for all forms of participation. Moreover, the representation of masculinity and the
effects on combatants are also increasingly beginning to be recognized, with the IDDRS recognizing traditional masculine roles, violent masculinity, and masculinities effects on the reporting of
sexual gender-based violence (SGBV), while outlining the need for accessibility for men and
women for services.34
The importance of such sensitivities coincides with peacebuilding’s desire to reform and
remedy not just the after-effects of conflict but to build a more resilient and just society than that

United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, ‘Operational
Guide IDDRS’ (United Nations), accessed 24 May 2022, https://www.unddr.org/operational-guide-iddrs/. – See more:
Hauge
33
See more: Cherilyn Elston, ‘Nunca Invisibles: Insurgent Memory and Self-Representation by Female Ex-Combatants in Colombia,’ Wasafiri 35, no. 4 (2020): 70–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/02690055.2020.1800254; Laura C. Cullen, ‘Female Combatants and the Post-Conflict Process in Sierra Leone’, Journal of International Women’s Studies
21, no. 2 (April 2020): 114-125,114A.
34
United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, ‘Operational
Guide IDDRS,’ 207. This growing sensitization of masculinity and men as a gendered element of conflict also coincides with UNSC Resolution 2106, which first “enlisted” men and boys’ effort to address unjust gender relations, and
recognized the effects of gender relations on them as well.
32
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preceded the ravages of conflict. With gendered lenses applied, peacebuilding and DDR attempt
to remedy the gendered harms inflicted during conflict and reform the structural gendered injustice
and violence of pre-conflict societies. By doing so, the peace made in post-conflict society does
not become patriarchal but introduces a holistic peace and agency for both men and women.
Building Peace
In peacebuilding’s goals to rebuild and reform post-conflict societies, the place of DDR is
as a pathway for combatants to see themselves over to peaceful co-existence. This includes a
peaceful, just, and mutualistic gender co-existence for both men and women. Texts such as Galtung’s ‘Three Approaches for Peace,’ Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, and UNSC Resolution
1325 all provide guidelines for the dynamics of peacebuilding as a practice, what DDR does within
its functions, and how gender is enveloped within it all. For women, their inclusion in programs,
unique experiences and vulnerabilities, and their participation in conflict must be addressed. On
the other hand, men’s gendered vulnerabilities and sensitivities must be addressed as they transition from combat to peace, a perspective that is only lightly taken in contemporary peacebuilding.
By not taking into account all gender perspectives in post-conflict programs, there is a severe risk
of remaining unaware of how conflict affects both combatants and civilians throughout the spectrum of participation and victimization while also risking the overall success of peacebuilding
projects. In response to the self-reinforcing issues born from conflict, it is important to address the
injustices and inequalities in a way that creates robust environments for peace to thrive where excombatants are better off in civilian life than in their lives of violence.
Section II: Men and Masculinities in Conflict, Transition, and Peace
The concept of masculinity and masculinities must be unpacked and applied to the subject
to fully comprehend the gendered paradigms of DDR processes concerning male combatants.

Matthews

15

Additionally, it is important to move away from gender binaries and expectations which confine
the ability to fully explain and critically analyze masculinities, as monolithic expectations lead to
oversimplification of the diverse factors of what one can consider ‘masculine.’ Moreover, it is
important to remember gender as an organization of social practices, often dictated (but not
wholly) by bodily structures.35 Factors such as race, class, ethnicity, age, sexuality, and gender are
largely determinate and dictating factors surrounding what constructs masculinity (and femininity)
and how it is performed.36 These factors and their norms are wholly present in how combatants
behave in conflict and peace and the transition between, acting as both pathways and barriers to
successful DDR processes.
As an anecdotal example of how masculinity may be implicated in peace development,
General Romeo Dallaire notes in his memoir Shake Hands with the Devil that Rwandan Patriotic
Army (RPA) soldiers (who were predominately young men) had wished for the civil war to end
so that they may start their families, according to the masculine and familial norms they subscribed
to as young Tutsi men.37 While gender and masculinity are not the full dictating factor in the success of transitional programs such as DDR, it is important to understand the implication that they
may have on these programs as cross-cutting and supporting features. In this section, the concept
of masculinities is further unpacked, alongside the concepts of violent masculinities and masculinities in peace transitions.
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Masculinities
While the study and discussion of masculinities had blossomed alongside the formation of
men’s studies in academic spaces in the 1970s, the publishing of Masculinities by R.W. Connell
produced the most influential and impactful conceptualization of masculinities for social science
analysis. Much like explained above, Connell states: ‘Masculinity is not a coherent object about
which a generalizing science can be produced’ and ‘if we broaden the angle of vision, we can see
masculinity, not as an isolated object, but as an aspect of a larger structure.’38 She articulates that
the norms and practices that define masculinity largely depend on the social and cultural environments they are surrounded by. More importantly, masculinity is defined by its ‘opposing’ and
contrasting relations with femininity. Lastly, Connell warns that even with the consideration of
race, class, and other factors, it is important to not sub-categorize or oversimplify within these
factors (e.g., a defined working-class or black masculinity), as shifting milieus exist between
them.39
Despite the immeasurable diversity of various masculinities, it is still an organization of
socialized gender relations with power structures created within it. This stratification creates what
Connell conceptualizes as hegemonic masculinities and subordinated masculinities, based on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony,’ where social constructions give authority and legitimacy
to ruling classes.40 The hegemonic form of masculinity is characterized by an accepted cultural
and institutional ideal of what the ‘archetypal’ man is meant to be as the dominant position.41 The
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accepted form of hegemony may ebb and flow with time but remains the generally accepted and
dominant form of performed masculinity. With the existence of the accepted dominant and hegemonic masculinity, there is the obverted subordinated masculinity, which is politically, socially,
and structurally stigmatized (and often punished) as the ‘not-preferred’ performance of the masculine gender.42 This will often subordinate and delegitimize men that deviate from the accepted
normative masculine framework for reasons ranging from non-violence to being homosexual.43
Often, this delegitimization will take on characterizations of femininity onto those displaying subordinate forms of masculinity (often with demasculinizing and feminizing vocabulary and actions
levied towards them).44 Between the hegemonic and the subordinated belong those who are ‘complicit’ in the masculine order, those who may not be striving for the hegemonic but loosely uphold
the values and norms of the hegemonic construction and uphold their position over the subordinate.45 For Connell, this acts as a ‘patriarchal dividend,’ as they get to enforce the social capital of
being ‘not them’ and continuing the patriarchal power they maintain over others, both male and
female.
The utility of Connell’s concept of masculinities allows us to analyze the power structures,
normative structures, and the diversity of masculinities that may be found within conflict. With
the three ‘positions’ of masculinity outlined by Connell (hegemonic, complicit, and subordinate),
we may be able to explain what masculinity in conflict prioritizes (such as strength, carrying of
arms, and the use of violence), what is the cultural and social context that surrounds it (and may
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be complicit, or benefitting, in its continuation), and why it may be difficult to transition from the
militant masculinity to a peaceful/citizen masculinity. Functionally, this transforms DDR as not
only a process of security but as a process of transforming masculine norms from violence to peace.
Connells' scholarship on masculinities has been the most influential basis of masculinities
as a theoretical study and has since been utilized throughout different fields and topic areas, from
sociology to health sciences.46 It has since grown to have been discussed in non-Global North
terms, using Global South epistemologies and ontologies, where strong criticisms can be levied.
Scholarship by Sakhumzi Mfecane discusses the disconnect between individualist and non-physical western orientations of masculinity compared to African ones that have a profound relationship
with the community, ancestry, and the body.47 For this paper, Connell's work will be continued to
be used, primarily due to the fact it remains the most influential, complete, and understood theory
in masculinity research.
Violent and Militant Masculinity
One important concept to unpack is the centrality of violence and militancy to masculinity
within conflict environments as the point of transition. Within this environment, part of ‘doing’
masculinity is the participation in conflict and violence. Part of this performance usually is built
around the traits and actions of aggression, endurance, unemotionality, and heterosexuality (usually prowess/conquest).48 Almost universally, militias and military units become incubators for
violent and militarized masculinities to take hold. Langa and Eagle note that similar processes of
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militarization and socialization in the context of masculinity have been seen in places such as
Germany to Vietnam, as combat groups become a place of identity formation.49 In this, militaries
and combat groups become places where men and boys are held to the militarized hegemonic
standard and often become places where ‘initiation’ into manhood is situated.50 David Morgan
illustrates the deep connection between masculinity and militarizing processes:
Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct. Despite far-reaching political,
social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity…The stance, facial expressions, and the weapons clearly connote aggression, courage,
a capacity for violence, and sometimes, a willingness for sacrifice. The uniform absorbs
individualities into a generalized and timeless masculinity while also connoting a control
of emotion and a subordination to a larger rationality.51
Inversely, any traits or behaviours deemed feminine are ridiculed and repressed in the process.52
However, while the traits are often deeply engrained in military/conflict spaces, they often are
preceded by traditional ideals of masculinity before a conflict has taken place in society at large.53
Often, militaries and combat groups exploit gender expectations and vulnerability to recruit young
men into their units, with images such as ‘machismo’ (and other varieties of the concept) being
important features of masculine appeal.54
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Equimundo, a gender and social justice NGO, links harmful masculine norms to violent
behaviours such as intimate/non-intimate violence, violence against children, sexual abuse, bullying, homicide and violent crime, suicide, and participation in war and conflict.55 While women are
increasingly understood to be complicit or participants in these just as men are, men largely take
up the majority of those who perpetrate these actions, largely because of the normative structures
of violent masculinity.56 Structurally, the norms which spawn violent behaviours are the pursuit of
‘achieving’ manhood (often stated as becoming ‘a real man’), policing masculine performance (the
gatekeeping of men’s masculine social status), developing norms around emotional expression
(often the repression of emotions), and dividing spaces according to gender expectations (largely
‘men’s work’ and ‘women’s work’).57 Overall, this reinforces the power of patriarchal power in
the social, economic, and political spheres. This, as Connell would state, provides the structural
mechanism to perpetuate the maintenance of masculine hegemony. Further, this allows for a selfreinforcing homosocial atmosphere, where male bonds are made and reinforced over militarized
norms and violent behaviours (ex. brothers in arms/comradeship) which often become even more
reinforced through acts of violence and conflict (especially in cases of rape).58 These factors become points of legitimization for the perpetration of violence of all forms.
Lastly, it can be argued that conflict spaces become a place for the contestation or proclamation of masculinity. Men, especially young men, may seek out violent and destructive behaviours in cases of social, economic, or political exclusion.59 They may act violently to objectify and

Heilman and Barker, ‘Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,’ 8. Equimundo was formerly
known as Promundo.
56
Heilman and Barker, ‘Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,’ 68–69.
57
Heilman and Barker, ‘Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,’ 19–22.
58
Langa and Eagle, ‘The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,’ 163–64; Miranda Alison, ‘Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity,’ Review of International Studies 33, no. 1 (January
2007): 77, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210507007310. In many cases, the use of drugs and alcohol also acted as
both a homosocial bonding experience, but also a way to suppress guilt about the violence used.
59
Heilman and Barker, ‘Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,’ 69.
55

Matthews

21

dehumanize both women and other men, often leading to violent actions such as rape or torture to
degrade and subordinate women and other men.60 Oftentimes, the contestation of masculinity is
part of a ‘struggle’ logic (expressed as ‘struggle masculinity’), where violent struggle creates men.
This can be seen in places of oppression, such as Apartheid South Africa, where young combatants
galvanize a militarized masculinity and a culture of violence in opposition to repression.61
Men in Transition and Masculinities in Peace Transitions
Given the deeply entrenched structures of hegemonic and militant masculinity, the challenge of DDR concerning it becomes to provide a pathway for men and boys to disengage from
the militant and violent expectations and norms into civilian and peaceful ones. This is especially
important and challenging in the context of those who were recruited as children, as much of their
lives have been dictated by the conditions of war and conflict. With ex-combatant men previously
inhabiting a space of power by way of hegemonic masculinity and the spoils of war attached to
militancy, moving into a space not only uncertainty in economic or political terms but also in social
and psychological/emotional terms. This makes DDR a focal point for not only the transition from
war to peace but a transition of the gender norms expected from those who previously engaged in
militant masculinity.
It is also important to consider the inverse; conflict environments also give rise to new
gender realities for women, where boundaries of femininity which previously may have strictly
resided in the ‘domestic’ world may now come to take on more ‘masculine’ roles and traits.62 This
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creates a place of tension, if not violence, in the post-conflict environment, which needs to be
addressed in DDR for the benefit of both men and women involved. In this environment, the risk
becomes one that a place of productive ‘challenge’ becomes one of a ‘crisis.’63 Additionally, men
now expected to do work deemed ‘domestic’ such as child care, are woefully underequipped and
unexperienced in child care and how to be fathers, causing insecurity and anxiety as they return
home.64 Moreover, peacebuilding’s broader attempt to address the acute effects of conflict and the
preceding injustices, including those of gender, makes the harmonization of post-conflict women’s
gains and the reintegration of men of utmost importance.
While the ‘making’ of militant masculinity has been a highly discussed topic of feminist
literature, its subsequent ‘unmaking’ has been less analyzed. Existing masculinities literature has
largely been dominated by psychological issues surrounding post-traumatic stress and analyses of
western military veterans, which some inferences may be made. An analysis of Israeli veterans
found high reluctance to engage in psychological therapy for post-traumatic stress symptoms due
to norms and cultures instilled by hegemonic and military masculinity. In response, there is a creation of ‘new masculinities’ or ‘hybrid masculinities’ that expands the allowances of traditional/hegemonic masculinity to include new features (such as openness for mental healthcare).65
This coincides with Connell’s assertion that masculinity and gender practices are ‘onto-formative’
which new meanings are continually constructed.66 States have become very involved in this
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formation/protection of militarized/hegemonic masculinities within transitions between military
and civilian life. Two large reasons exist; 1) ex-combatants may use their influence as carriers of
hegemonic masculinity to impede the legitimacy of their policies and governance, and 2) the continuance of the recruitment/retention of boys and men within the armed forces within the hegemonic masculinity framework (and even the continuance of hegemonic masculine norms in the
wider civilian world).67 It is for these reasons that post-war transition projects are often built around
masculine norms and disadvantaging of women.68 This stage of transition thus becomes a very
fluid stage where hegemonies are re-constructed and reinforced and has the potential to further
entrench masculine privileges over subordinate men or women.
Understanding Masculinities
The theoretical importance of understanding the fluidity and multitudes of masculinities
allows us to analyze and examine masculinities in their places of power, vulnerabilities, their factors, the allowances created under them, and ways that militaries and armed groups may use norms
of masculinity in their benefit. Within post-conflict environments, the utility of these understandings can give insights on how to create gender-just DDR and peacebuilding for both ex-combatants
and the broader communities affected by conflict and existing gender structures. As stated above,
the study of the ‘undoing’ of militarized and violent masculinity has been largely absent from
analyses. Thus, the continued study of its proximity to peace processes gives insights for future
programming of these structures.
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Section III: The Kivu Region and its Neighbours: History and Context

The wounds of conflict and violence within the DRC’s Kivu region are deeply entrenched
in the complicated context of its history of colonialism, imperialism, interventionism, authoritarianism, inter-group violence, and continental war. The region is characterized by an ever-changing
and complex environment of various actors, interests, identities, and histories that are complicated
and multifaceted but are tremendously important to consider for peacebuilding processes and development. Further, the nature of its history and the factors above make the problems of the Kivu
region inherently interconnected with its neighbours, especially Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi,
adding a dimension which further complicates the ability to bring lasting peace to the region. To
fully explore all the historical factors and the peoples that have been affected them fall outside the
scope of this paper and would need a study of its own; thus, this paper will briefly and concisely
cover the history of each state through three “benchmark periods,” namely, their colonial periods
(the late-1800s and early-1900s), their decolonial periods (1950s-1970s), and aftermath of the
Rwandan genocide (the 1990s-2000s).69 These periods will detail the nature of colonial administration and its practices, the dynamics presented by the decolonization, and the fallout that the
states experienced in the 1990s into the early 2000s. The section will end with a brief explanation
of the confluences of these histories in the Kivu’s contemporary history. By adding the broader
historical dynamics of the region and its neighbours to analysis, greater inferences on how and
why peace processes such as DDR struggle (and fail) may be obtained.
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The Colonial Context
All four countries are by-products of their colonial pasts, with Uganda being ruled by the
British, while the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi were ruled by Belgium.70 In Uganda and RuandaUrundi, colonial powers ruled under divide and conquer strategies where power was privileged to
a few, causing deep inter-group resentment and paving the future for ethnonational strife, while
also setting in place the structural allowance for authoritarian rule.71 In the Congo, the personal
rule of the Belgian King Leopold II and the later administration by the Belgian government were
intensely violent, causing one of the continent’s first modern genocides.72 Foreign domination
from those powers in many ways set in motion the circumstances of conflict and insecurity experienced by those states currently, as they built systems of control, oppression, and extraction with
little regard of the consequences for those subjected to them.
Additionally, the coloniality of gender is also part of the picture, alongside the racialization
built into the power structures.73 This includes the primacy of patriarchal power expressed through
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binate sex roles, and the narrowing of the resources, labour, authority, and the construction of race.
The effects of the colonial era would reverberate through towards the present, as the structures and
states that precede the current era had sown the seeds for the continuous insecurity felt today, as a
region, states, and gender relations.
The Cold War, Independence, and Post-Independence Insecurity
The wave of independence was followed by an explosion of the structural inequities formed
during the colonial era, with genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass displacement, coup d’états, and warfare consuming the region, while also becoming embroiled with the Cold War politics waged by
Western and Eastern actors. The same tools of control and violence used in the colonial era were
the same used by the strongmen and elites in independence, perpetuating the violence suffered for
generations.
In Uganda, the boiling cauldron left from divide and conquer strategies fermented itself
into racial, class, and tribal division, with a government unreceptive to its citizens. From the period
of the 1960s to the 1980s, power was violently passed through dictators, first in the hands of Milton
Obote, then Idi Amin Dada, back into the hands of Obote, before being wrestled away by the
current leader Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM).74 Alongside the
jockeying for power and the struggles between strongmen, hundreds of thousands, if not millions
of civilians, were killed, raped, and tortured, alongside mass destruction of property and looting.75
In the Congo, independence was immediately met with complete fallout. Within weeks,
mutinies within the military and secessionist forces in Kasai and Katanga threw the newly formed
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state into immediate turmoil.76 The first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, successfully petitioned
the UN for a peacekeeping mission while asking the USSR for support in confronting the uprisings.77 The inclusion of the USSR by Lumumba led to his overthrow and assassination in a BelgoAmerican-backed coup, which would later pave the way for Western-backed Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu to the presidency of which he would over the coming decades create a lasting dictatorship.78 Mobutu’s rule would see harsh repression at the hands of military and mercenary forces,
while social, political, and economic infrastructure was routed for the gain of Mobutu and his
regime.79
In Rwanda and Burundi, the two states forked in their political and social development but
would remain deeply implicated in each other’s post-independence experiences. Colonization in
Rwanda brought a form of counter-elite to Hutus who previously were disenfranchised in colonial
administration, resulting in the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy to place a Hutu republican government, with many Tutsis fleeing.80 A coup would put Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana in
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power in Rwanda in 1973, continuing anti-Tutsi policies and quotas.81 Burundi, in contrast, supported the monarchy more as ethnic divisions were not as pronounced; however, ganwas postured
politically and with more hostility.82 Early attempts at building a bi-ethnic government were cut
short with the assassination of two Prime Ministers.83 The result of the repeated collapsed attempts
of bi-ethnic governance led to the abolishment of the monarchy, with a Tutsi dictatorship under
Michel Micombero placed in its stead, with the justification of harshly ‘defending’ against Hutu
uprising.84
Independence and the insecurity and conflict felt after it firmly demonstrated that the structures created in the colonial era had firmly implanted themselves in the region, even among its
political classes. Violence became part of day-to-day life both inside and outside political structures. The movement of the displaced through the borders of each state also exemplifies how interconnected the region's security is, as push-and-pull factors, from ethnic relations and political
situations, directly and indirectly, affect the neighbours. While the violence experienced in this
time was abhorrent, it would only serve as a precursor to the events in the post-Cold War.
The 1990s, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Kivutien Connection
Resting squarely in the center between the states, the Kivus would become the centrepiece
of the horrible effects of a century of colonial violence, dictatorships and strongmen, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and large-scale displacement. While the events in one state did tend to have a strong
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effect in another, none other was as strong as the events which unfolded during and after the Rwandan Genocide. As stated by Gérard Prunier:
Let me be clear: the Rwandese genocide and its consequences did not cause the implosion
of the Congo basin and its periphery. It acted as a catalyst, precipitating a crisis that had
been latent for a good many years and that later reached far beyond its original Great Lakes
locus. This is why the situation become so serious. The Rwandese genocide has been both
a product and a further cause of an enormous African crisis: its very occurrence was a
symptom, its nontreatment spread the disease.85
In the context of Prunier’s observation, the Kivu region was the first major (and lasting) casualty
of the disease.
The genocide was preceded by a civil war fought between the Rwandan MRND government, supported by Zaire, and the exiled Tutsi RPF, who had received training and support from
Uganda. Burundi would also be engulfed in a civil war, as their President, Melchior Ndadaye,
would be assassinated and succeeded by Cyprien Ntaryamira (a Hutu), causing unrest.86 Flying
back from Dar-es-Salaam, where talks to end the Rwandan Civil War were conducted, Presidents
Habyarimana and Ntaryamira were shot down.87 The assassination sparked the genocide in
Rwanda, prompting the RPF to go on the offensive. The aftermath of the genocide would have the
genocidaire regime and many ordinary Hutus flee to Zaire, while the RPF claimed a pyrrhic victory
and formed a new Rwandan government.88
This mass migration and security environment was the flashpoint that caused the continent
to fall into large-scale warfare with the beginning of the First Congo War.89 Ethnic Tutsis
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(Banyamulenge) in the Kivu region were increasingly vulnerable and targeted by both Zairean and
genocidaire officials and militants, and with deteriorating regional relations between
Rwanda/Uganda and Zaire, the region descended into warfare.90 The conflict was spurred and
sustained by various factors; first, the ethnic interconnections and insecurity of the Kivu region
caused concern while also allowing for alliances to be made in Zairean territory. 91 Second, the
mineral wealth within the region had made the conflict a wealth-seeking venture for many ‘entrepreneurial’ generals and combatants.92 Third, growing dissent, both internal and external, with the
Mobutuist regime had united many for regime change in Zaire.93 By the end of the war, Mobutu
was overthrown and replaced with Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
While the First Congo War had ended with the overthrow of the Mobutuist regime, it would
not be long until conflict sparked again. Kabila, who had needed the support of Rwanda and
Uganda to overthrow Mobutu, ordered the retreat of Rwandan and Ugandan troops.94 The order
caused an immediate fracture between Kinshasa and Kigali/Kampala, which had sustained territorial, security, economic, and ethnological interests in the Kivu region.95 In addition, many Banyamulenge in the Kivu region felt like Kinshasa had turned its back on them, prompting them to take
up arms against the Congolese government, with support from Uganda and Rwanda starting the
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Second Congo War.96 With the DRC returning to conflict, many outside actors, including Angola
and Zimbabwe, joined in, expanding the scope of the conflict.97 Changing alliances, the proliferation of armed groups, and frequent splintering of armed groups further complicated the security
environment.98 After almost five years of war, the assassination of Kabila (and the ascension of
his son, Joseph) and fatigue of war spurred many states to settle in various peace agreements and
settlements, while the first UN peacekeeping mission of MONUC was started to implement the
various peace processes.99
Post-Congo Wars and Present Conflict
While the states involved had quietly retreated from the Congo Wars, the conflict had yet
been settled, and the Kivu region was as insecure as when the wars started, as high-intensity conflict between states had been replaced by sustained low-intensity conflict between non-state actors
(but often with some state backing). This is abundantly true in the Kivu region, which has now a
conflict of its own, known as the ‘Kivu Conflict.’ Armed groups range from Islamic State-sponsored Allied Democratic Front (ADF), to Rwandan-backed groups such as the Congrès national
pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) and Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), to local Mai-mai rebel
groups have all contributed to nearly 20 years of conflict in the region.100 Additionally, while state
militaries face off with militias (with Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian forces often in Congolese
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territory), they often themselves commit crimes against humanity, adding to the chaos already
felt.101 The effects have meant vast amounts of internal and external displacements and hundreds
of thousands of combat deaths and excess deaths.102 The UN mission, which had been started in
the aftermath of the Congo Wars, was upgraded to a Chapter VII mission (MONUSCO), substantially broadening its mandate to a ‘stabilization mission’ with the UN itself engaging in military
operations against insurgent forces alongside the Congolese military.103 Countless attempts at
DDR, supported by the national government and the international community, have struggled to
adequately civilianize many combatants whom many have not known a life without conflict in the
region.104 This often stems from a loss of political will, bureaucracy, funding, economics, and
fragile and failing security environments which ex-combatants are meant to reintegrate to. Lastly,
it is impossible to understate the place that sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence has throughout history, present in the violence of the colonial era, the wave of independence,
the regional wars, and the present.105
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Section IV: Analysis - Masculinity, Conflict, and DDR in the Kivu Region
Aside from the great political complications in the Kivu region, a great number of smaller
and equally complex factors complicate facilitating peace within the region. As stated by Verwimp, Justino, and Brück: ‘at a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals’ behaviour
and their interactions with their immediate surroundings’, which in the context of gender, influences the behaviours of both individuals and groups and shapes their interactions with society at
large.106 The effects of gender also collide with the individual experiences of the ex-combatant in
conflict and peace, whether the combatant was recruited as a child, how they are socialized, indoctrinated, and had agency in conflict, and how they interact with society in post-conflict life,
and how they adjust into the varying circumstances presented to them in peace.107 The distinctions
which individuals experience will significantly change how DDR is implemented and delivered to
ex-combatants. DDR, a process that reinserts them in civilian life, interacts with the gendered
expectations of ex-combatants, their families, and the communities in which they are re-entering,
and how they deal with the effects sustained during the conflict. Lastly, it also begs the question
of how masculinity is changed, affirmed, and prioritized in the post-conflict world, whether DDR
programs are helping with a more just post-conflict environment, whether they are entrenching the
exact patriarchal and masculine expectations that existed before the conflict had arisen, and how
they interact with the place of women, who likely had to endure their transitions during periods of
conflict.
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Child-Soldiers: Boys and young men in transition
Within the Kivu region, the use of child soldiers has been and continues to be heavily used
by many different armed groups, including government military forces. It is speculated that 60%
of combatants in the Eastern DRC are composed of child soldiers, some as young as six years
old.108 It is also important to consider that the region is exceptionally young, with 47% of the
population in the DRC being under the age of 15.109 This has also been an issue in both Uganda
and Burundi, where conflicts had notorious use of child soldiers in the past and present.110 For
boys, both forcibly and voluntarily recruited into armed groups, indoctrination and socialization
into violence are often done in line with norms of masculinity that are often adjusted for the participation and perpetuation of violence, skewing prior notions of masculinity and femininity.111
Often, this socialization also coincides with traditional rites of passage often seen outside combat
life, but would also be reinforced with substance use, beatings or threats of violence, building intergroup complicity and solidarity (often through acts such as gang rape), obedience, the association
of masculine traits with those of violence, subjugating of women, and subject them to such living
that survival is the only thing on the child’s mind, deeply traumatizing them.112 Additionally, this
process of socialization and indoctrination also increases the incidence of PTSS and appetitive
aggression (both aggravated by childhood involvement in combat), which complicate the lives of
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former combatants later in life while also complicating long-term security goals.113 Lastly, while
in many cases, children do not choose to engage in combat groups, they return to their communities
where they are not accepted by their family or peers, often adding to the complications of reintegration and post-conflict life.114
Until recently, DDR programs have approached issues of child soldiery in terms that were
largely a-gendered or gender-neutral, which have had negative impacts on girls involved in combat
groups (who were often wholly invisible and unaddressed to the programs), but likely also have
not addressed the intricacies of boys’ participation either.115 With DDR programs primarily focused on security concerns, the post-conflict deprogramming/sensitization, psychosocial care, educational needs, and familial aspects remain unaddressed.116 In terms of gender, this must take
resocialization, reformulation, and reconstruction of the conceptions of gender, especially for boys
who have likely not known anything other than what was experienced in armed groups. As noted
by Trenholm et al., militarized notions of masculinity form a near cult-like condition on ex-child
soldiers who continue on highly narrow conceptions of masculinity with hierarchical (that may
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also have ethnic elements), patriarchal, and violent behaviours in civilian life.117 Additionally, the
ability to provide and protect is further embedded, thus making any form of poverty deeply humiliating and emasculating.118 This is deeply entrenched in former child soldiers, as their early involvement in their lives had exposed them at an age of high pliability in their identities, high familial dependency, and a highly developmental stage.119 Thus, boys' involvement with armed
groups at a young age positions them early on have interrupted and highjacked processes of manhood, subscribing them to a masculine model that can become a barrier to post-conflict life and
have damaging effects upon the attempt of reintegration.
Consequently, DDR processes for ex-child soldiers will likely have to include gender sensitization conjoined with specialized children’s programs like sensitized community re-entry
(where family and community are educated about the effects, difficulties, and realities of child
soldiery), education, and psychosocial care.120As Banholzer and Haer add, the impact of social
attachments created in the combat group must also be addressed, as child soldiers create informal
social networks in place of family structures they would have before their participation.121 As outlined above, the socialization process of the recruitment of child soldiers follows militarized and
masculinist logic of hierarchy, obedience, and solidarity, and as such, are should be part of the
overarching resocialization process in DDR transitions.122 In the case of ex-child soldiers and
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adults who were recruited as child soldiers, there are added complexities and dimensions to consider which are deeply relevant to the peace processes, as gender conceptions are deeper entrenched than regular ex-combatants.
Broken States and Broken Men
Of course, the post-conflict world will be quite different for many combatants, as conflict
will have changed how ex-combatants view themselves and the environment around them. In the
Kivu region, there are multiple barriers which intersect with masculine norms which cause friction
in the ability of ex-combatants to successfully go through the DDR process. Most glaringly, the
extreme poverty which characterizes the region in the post-conflict environment poses the largest
threat to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. As Scorgie notes surrounding ADF recruitment and retention in the Congolese/Ugandan borderlands, the persistent state of conflict in North
Kivu had left many men without education and employment prospects, causing one of the leading
causes in recruitment and retention of insurgent forces (particularly young men).123 She further
iterates that even in the cases of attempted reintegration, ex-combatants were met with the same
impoverished conditions that led them to join militant groups in the first place. 124 Following this,
the destruction of institutions and the lack of government responses to grievances build tensions
that are rife for the opportunism of militia groups.125 Both institutional decay and poverty are further exacerbated by the effects of mass migrations, as well as adding frictions of ethnic identities,
of which the region has seen plenty since the 1990s.126 Lastly, the regions often suffer from a
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‘peace’ that is often unstable, incomplete, or simply not present. As stated by Prunier, the most
well-meaning plans of DDR become impractical as soon as they hit the ground due to the intractability of the region caused by the power held by regional militias or state dysfunction.127
At face value, these seem like obvious and a-gendered reasons for continued instability and
DDR difficulties, but these factors will present themselves through the gender identity of the combatant. Feelings of insecurity, poverty, and grievances can and are mediated and negotiated
through conceptions of gender. As Hollander notes, the expectations of manhood, such as the ability to protect and provide, prescribe a heavy weight not just placed by men onto themselves, but
also on family and the community as a whole.128 Many gender-oriented interventions, such as
microcredit and educational training, are primarily centred on women which have led to men being
excluded from transitional programs. Desiree Lwambo writes that the exclusion of men in peacebuilding programs is not just a missed opportunity to educate on gender equality, but also creates
friction between community and family members as men’s employment is unaddressed, while
women access these programs with no consent of male family members.129 Should the expectations
not be met and feelings of emasculation are felt, men turn to avenues such as violence and aggression when productive ones are unavailable.130 In contexts of conflict, and militarized masculinity,
it is logical for men to resort to what they know best in how to reclaim personal power and social
capital, using the same traits and virtues instilled through combat, such as risk-taking, physical
violence, othering (often other ethnic groups), and overall performing the ‘big man’ by exerting
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control on those around them.131 To return to the concept of hegemony and militant masculinities
explored earlier, the inability to effectively carry out what is thought to be owed by the right of
hegemony is a humiliating affair, and the traits and expectations of militancy imbued into masculinity provide the avenue to regain what is owed.
Even in the case of post-conflict reconciliation, the ability to move from conflict to peace
can be seen as ‘unmanly,’ with acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, and restitution regarded
as feminine, as men are expected to resolve differences in battle.132 Inversely, some evidence
shows that militancy has acted as a barrier to masculine norms and has spurred men to return to
peace. Friðriksdóttir demonstrates that some ex-combatants in Burundi were able to disconnect
their masculinity in combat from that in civilian life, and found that their time in combat distracted
them from getting educated and starting their families.133 However, ex-combatants stated that the
socio-economic impacts of being part of combat groups intrude on their self-actualization as men,
as it stalled their growth in post-conflict environments, which makes both experiences intrinsically
interconnected.134 This breaks down material and financial considerations are imperative not just
for their own sake, but demonstrates that they have deep impacts on feelings of identity and selfexpectations.
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Psychosocial Issues for Post-Conflict Men and Boys
On top of the material factors of post-conflict life, men return to their communities with
deep psychological and emotional scars that will likely remain with them for the rest of their lives.
As shown in the case of child soldiers, the process of militarization and socialization in armed
groups has dramatic implications on the psychosocial wellbeing of ex-combatants, with many displaying symptoms of PTSS, appetitive aggression, and substance abuse, as well as depression and
suicidality.135 In the terms of psychosocial care, men have some normative barriers to overcome
in seeking treatment, such as the need to be courageous, emotionless, and physically and mentally
strong. For example, in an analysis of male victims of sexual violence, many men rejected or were
extremely hesitant to participate in mental health care, largely due to the fear of being perceived
as weak or feminine.136 Additionally, the norm of being able ‘to fend for yourself’ poses a barrier
to seeking care, and is likely even more complicated by militarized experiences, which demanded
that emotional and mental trauma be repressed to carry out duties.137 The risks of the avoidance of
such care are great. Schmitt et al. present that many ex-combatants, in part due to their psychosocial state from combat, have high degrees of stigma attached to them, with 66% of respondents of
s survey in the eastern DRC expressing that they were not comfortable sharing a village or neighbourhood with ex-combatants.138 This stigmatization often leads to violent outbursts and
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recidivism, as ex-combatant hindsight may look fondly on the feeling of respect and power that
was given to them in armed group life.139
Building New Masculinities or Simply Recreating Old Ones?
One major danger of the masculine lens towards the DDR process is building a framework
that over-prioritizes men’s programing or reinforces pre-conflict masculine conceptions. As expressed in an earlier section, the conception of hybrid masculinity takes on new ‘feminine’ traits,
such as discussions of emotions, vulnerability, and the acceptance of changed gender norms, establishing new hegemonic masculinity which still subordinates women or non-hegemonic males.
This becomes even more problematic as women take up traditionally masculine roles in times of
conflict, and often turn to be points of friction (and violence) with returning men.140 For DDR
programming, there is a series of risks and opportunities for post-conflict gender relations, where
men can be returned to civilian life with new expectations of themselves and others, or they can
be returned in line with preconceived gender norms.
The experiences of Rwanda show both sides of this experience. Duriesmith and Holmes
note that the Rwandan processes of DDR/SSR were highly skewed to pre-conflict notions of masculinity, while SSR programs were highly oriented to traits and norms of militant masculinity. The
authors outline that post-civil war/genocide narratives surrounding military service were embroiled in ‘masculinity nostalgia’ which mythologized pre-colonial peace, characterized by ‘patriarchal power, authority, and gender certainty,’ and binaries of male ‘good soldiers’ and female
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‘peacebuilders’.141 On the side of DDR, many ‘special interests’, such as men suffering from physical and mental trauma, child soldiers, LGBT and the elderly, were discreetly put into DDR to
maintain the public image of gender.142 On the other hand, the post-conflict world was also a time
of transition, somewhat, from traditional roles and combatting GBV. Williamson notes that postgenocide Rwanda had also scarred the general population from notions of violence in proximity
to masculinity, and through the process of ndi umunyarwanda (Rwandicity), reprioritized labour
in place of violence as masculine virtues.143 Moreover, Carlson and Randell note that Rwandan
state institutions had focused on dismantling structural violence toward women, challenging traditional masculinity and working with communities to allow for more significant advancements in
gender equality.144 This is in large part due to the large demographic deficit suffered in Rwanda as
a result of the genocide, where the Rwandan population had gone a drastic shift as women represented around 57% of the overall population.145
Remaking Men
These cases remind us that whether intentional or not, DDR is deeply implicated in the
manner in which gender relations are treated going forward in peace. The processes which peacebuilding and DDR attempt to create for lasting post-conflict settlements will have impacts, and be
interpreted, in the terms given by gender norms and expectations. They can provide a pathway for
new understandings of gender, either by reinforcing hegemonic conceptions or altering them. For
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ex-child soldiers, whose only experiences with manhood are bound by conflict, these will be difficult to overcome as psychosocial factors, material factors, and societal factors create intersecting
and complicating barriers to post-combat life.146 These continue for adult combatants, which will
have to navigate re-entry into civilian life with deteriorated economics, institutions, social fabrics,
and changed gender relations. The success of peacebuilding and DDR are attached to the virtues
and norms felt by ex-combatants and their social environments as a whole, whether peace is felt
positively by the combatant, and whether they re-enter the post-conflict world ready for the
changes it has undergone.
Section V: A Man's World - Masculinities, DDR, and Peacebuilding Globally
The case of the Kivus provides a lens to analyze gender frameworks and responses to conflict on the global stage. Often, the place of masculinity and the vulnerabilities of men and boys
has not been fully explored, not just in the Kivus, but also in post-conflict transitions around the
globe. As explored in past sections, the implications of masculinity are closely entwined with the
creation and perpetuation of conflict, and transitions are not just judged based on their material
conditions, but also the perceptions of how it supports ‘what it is to be men.’ The Kivutien case
provides several lessons for the global gender and peace frameworks and practices. Additionally,
the inclusion of the masculine lens mustn't displace the work done to incorporate women and girls
into gender frameworks, but rather supplement a greater and more holistic picture of how gender
is related to post-conflict environments. Importantly, the inclusion of masculinities ought to
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dismantle binate assumptions on the vulnerabilities and power dynamics in conflict. This section
will explore lessons for the greater gender and peacebuilding community, and how they can lead
to better gender responses in the future.
Gendering Men
As Kimberly Theidon wrote in her study between masculinity and DDR within the context
of Colombia, the ‘gendering’ of DDR was a form of policy speak for ‘adding women’ and failed
to address the men as gender subjects within itself.147 This was and is a gross omission, considering
how the affairs of war are generally dictated by men and that the effects of militarization on gender
ideology are as crucial as the armaments that fight them.148 The effects of militarized identities
surrounding prestige, security, and access, perpetuated by general culture, encourage the use of
violence and makes them susceptible to the recruitment tactics of armed groups.149 The scholarship
speaks to the intrinsic need of tying the progression of peace to the perceptions of those that fight
within them, adding factors of identity that can make post-conflict processes more salient than
without such analyses.150 This is further reinforced for our case by Woodbury, as she discusses
how gender factors help induce reasoning when political dispositions and ideology are unclear.151
Gender analyses from the masculine lens allow for the ability to see insecurities and vulnerabilities
(for both women and men) from another light, allowing for greater refinement in how post-conflict
processes affect the lives and perceptions of ex-combatants.
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Breaking Victim/Perpetrator Dichotomies
The additional benefit of bringing lenses of masculinity to gender issues and post-conflict
processes is the disruption of victim/perpetrator dichotomies. By no means does this mean that
focusing more on masculinity and its effects will allow those who commit violence off the hook;
however, it can lead to greater analyses of why and how men react to their environments before
and after conflict.
This can best be demonstrated with the effects of poverty and ongoing insecurity as factors
which induce many men to recruit into armed groups, expressing a material dilemma that exacerbates gender identity struggles. In the case of Colombian combatants, many in precarious and
marginalized positions only have their ‘bodily capital’ to trade on the labour market and often
carry and use weapons as a result.152 With men’s ‘bodily capital’ involved in fighting comes with
the after-effects of doing so, namely the physical and psychosocial damages attached to it.153 In
the post-conflict environment, men may feel ‘feminized’ by their dependent roles while also receiving the benefits accrued by their masculine/patriarchal dividend, causing an in-between of
feminization/masculinization while straddling between perpetration/victimization. This is made
even more clear with the involvement of child soldiers, who were often abducted or forced into
conflict while also having agency for the actions they commit.154
The breaking of victim/perpetrator dichotomies produces many challenges to DDR and
transitional justice as a whole, as it has to reconcile the pre-determining factors of conflict
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participation while also detangling the factors of reconciliation as it deals with ex-combatants that
perpetuated the same conditions that had pushed them into conflict, to begin with, and their participation in violence on their communities.
Psychosocial/Behaviour
Taking masculinities into consideration can also give perspectives on psychosocial and
behavioural components of post-conflict processes.155 Factors of post-traumatic stress syndrome
(PTSS), appetitive aggression, and other post-conflict psychosocial issues and interventions should
be analyzed through lenses of gender and masculinity, with their utility and effectivity tied into
the gendered structures they inhabit. As stated in the last section, some men may hesitate to engage
in psychosocial treatments due to gendered expectations and stigmatization.156 This is further compounded with factors of appetitive aggression, which were ingrained as part of their socialization
processes in combat groups, and worsened in cases of child soldiery, as factors of aggression are
built into the conceptions of masculinity.157 This may produce research and programming on how
to deliver psychosocial care in gender-sensitive ways and increase the effectiveness of psychosocial treatments for men and their communities.
There are also lessons to be had in the individual and group behaviours around violence
perpetration, giving insight on how to provide pathways to peace.158 Research by Rebecca Littman
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and Miranda Alison, both inside and outside the Great Lakes region, describes how violence can
be a process in which bonds are created and strengthened while allowing for the suppression of
guilt and doubt.159 This violent socialization process should be further studied and addressed in
post-conflict processes, including DDR programming, both at collective and individual levels.
Economics and Politics
Through the post-conflict environment, the realities of economics and politics will likely
be heavily altered from what came before. The intersections of economic and political structures
with gender in post-conflict are places of tension, as men attempt to integrate into civilian economic life while women have assumed greater positions in economic and political structures in the
absence of men. As outlined by Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, post-conflict involvement of women in
economics and decision-making has led to increased capacity, local participation, regeneration,
and encourages reconciliation.160 Therefore, it is imperative that ex-combatants reintegrate into
post-conflict environments with not only skills training and educational opportunities, but they
should be reintegrated with skills conducive to supporting domestic tasks, such as childcare. Moreover, as discussed in the past section, post-conflict programs such as micro-credit and fiscal education may be more effective when applied universally rather than singling out women. This provides a greater ability to participate in post-conflict society and resocialization while providing a
pathway for a more gender-just transition for women.161
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On the political end, politics must become wholly sensitive to positions of both women and
men, inclusive of the political rights of women and be responsive to frustrations experienced by
ex-combatant men. Dolan explains that in the wake of the Arab Spring, many ex-combatant men
were shunted out of political decision-making, leading to feelings of powerlessness and resentment, leading to change but not structural change.162 The sense of powerlessness resulted from
young males being unable to perform many traditional roles expected of them, mainly providing
for (or even starting) their families.163 Often, this powerlessness leads to resentment towards
women and frameworks that outline the disempowerment of women instead of addressing the root
causes, which are often entrenched in patriarchal systems.164 Some work has been done to allow
women to be included in post-conflict transitions in Rwanda, especially in economics and political
structures; Carlson and Randell outline that the key to doing such transitions has rested upon
changing normative structures around masculinity.165
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
One aspect of recognizing masculinities in the face of post-conflict transitions and gender
relations is the effect it may have on UNSC Resolution 1325. The UN document, outlining the
inclusion of a gender lens to peacebuilding and transitions to peace, was designed to increase the
participation of women in post-conflict mechanisms and peace agreement negotiations. The inclusion of women into these programs, without a doubt, is integral to gender-just transitions into
peace. However, the limiting of the gender lens down to strictly women causes two significant
issues: oversimplifies gender-relations from a set of diverse social practices for both sexes down
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to solely that of the positions of women and girls, and second, erases the factors, vulnerabilities,
and experiences that men in post-conflict scenarios may uniquely feel.
On the first point, some feminist scholars have outlined that Resolution 1325 has struggled
to fundamentally alter the structural change of post-conflict security structures and discourses,
which continue to be dominated by patriarchal attitudes. This is the position of Dolan in which he
states: ‘in short, simplistic and stereotypical gender binaries, characterized by a unidirectional balance of power in favour of all men, to the disadvantage of all women, are continually re-inscribed.’166 Further, Nadine Puechguirbal notes that: ‘women are primarily represented in a narrow
essentialist definition that allows male decision-makers to keep them in the subordinated position
of victim, thus removing their agency.’167 This essentialized and limited view of women crystalizes
women into a place of vulnerability and men into places of power. This disconnects women from
power in post-conflict environments as a ‘special interest group.’168 It also entrenches men as
solely advantaged, which downplays their places of vulnerability in conflict. While Resolution
2106 attempts to reconcile this gap, it still does not truly attempt to grasp the binary the resolution
texts set out in the first place.169
This brings us to the second point; that the unique vulnerabilities felt by boys and men are
not as discussed as those of women in Resolution 1325. In a reversal from Cynthia Enloe’s original
question in ‘where are the women?’, the question now being asked is ‘where are the men?’ in the
analysis and inclusion of masculinities in peace frameworks. This may be due to feminist lenses
being primarily occupied with the struggles of women and girls in security, conflict, and policy
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circles, dealing with evident inequalities women face in conflict and post-conflict environments.170
Phillipp Schulz outlines that ‘gender’ has been presented in limited, reductionist, and dichotomous
accounts of victimhood, with men being characterized as naturally violent perpetrators. 171 Within
this framework, the attention to men and masculinities may seem counter-productive, or even ignorant, in the face of the obvious deficits in representation for women in post-conflict arrangements. However, as outlined throughout this paper, this response to gender being synonymous
with women and girls is often spurred from a conception that they are being subjects of victimization and protection, while men are treated as an ‘exception.’172 In light of the gendercidal consequences of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the soldiery of boys, and the sexual violence perpetrated
against men and boys in conflict spaces due to the assumptions of their patriarchal power and their
societies, the frameworks and responses to conflict ought to take note of their gendered vulnerabilities just as those suffered from women.173
Altogether, the Kivutien case, among many others worldwide, exposes that current international gender-sensitivity frameworks are oriented in overly binate terms and fail to fully incorporate the vulnerabilities of men and boys. The orientation of Resolution 1325 policy enshrines a
power dynamic which keeps women in a state of victimization and ‘special interest,’ while masculinity and male experiences remain a-gendered. The inclusion of masculinity in peace
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frameworks and responses allows for a greater picture to be accounted for in formulating postconflict programs and responses.
Holistic Gender Practice and Peace
Through the Kivutien case, the most important lesson to be gained is that every ex-combatant is a product of gender relations and practices that inform how they perceive the post-conflict
world. The dangers of ignoring such perceptions and the subsequent discontent are to ignore very
real threats to both short-term and long-term successes of post-conflict gender programming for
both women and men. Economic and political conditions and their relationships with ex-combatants pressure them into spots of precarity and insecurity, which endangers the peace process, other
civilians and their own families. Mounting research shows that psychosocial care and accessibility
are imperative to a functioning peace process. Still, dimensions of masculinity in post-combat life
have been primarily studied only in Western contexts. Lastly, the implications of how masculinity
is implicated and is changed in post-conflict processes are due for much more study and debate.
Overall, there are gender and power implication that have real effects on post-conflict responses,
the structures and programs that implement them, and the global institutions that configure them.
Conclusion
The Kivus, a region followed by a long shadow of colonization, conflict, genocide, and
humanitarian catastrophe, still faces the uphill battle of building a lasting and robust peace for its
civilians, citizens, and those in its neighbouring states. The expansion of gender lenses of men and
boys, the masculine roles they seek to assume, and how they interact with the world around them
provides a greater view into the experiences, difficulties, and realities of what it is to be a man in
conflict and in peace. By no means is this a rebuke of feminist work, which the field of masculinity
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studies rests so firmly upon, but rather an attempt to build upon it towards a more whole representation of the gendered world.
Gendered norms, violence, and the outcomes they produce must be inspected in the fullest
picture that can be assumed and include the men and boys that interact with it as perpetrators,
victims, survivors, and everything in between. Overall, this is a lens that needs to be more widely
utilized by peace practitioners, researchers, NGOs, and international institutions alike, as it remains widely under-explored throughout conflict and gender research and practices. This exclusion will likely perpetuate existing inequities and deficiencies in gender frameworks and policies,
with men falsely assumed to be a-gendered participants in a gendered world. Additionally, the
inclusion of masculine lenses allows for the greater ability to inspect the structures of gender relations, including patriarchal systems that continue to stratify the masculine and non-masculine.
The gender roles of combatants and ex-combatants as they attempt to enter and re-enter
civilian life must be included in these analyses, as extremely precarious environments are sure to
strain the roles and expectations many have in their identities. Throughout their difficulties and
failures, DDR programs must take into account every factor that flows through them for them to
be successful and replicable programs for peacebuilding. While DDR programs pose a series of
challenges, they also pose unique opportunities to build peaceful societies which are free from the
inequities, inequalities, and structural violence that may have given rise to conflict in the first
place. That opportunity is also one for gender justice for all, and it should not be missed.
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